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The first part of this paper examines the behaviour of rupiah over the last seven years 
(1996 - 2002) to ascertain whether in fact there is specific evidence of a return to de 
facto US dollar peg in Indonesia. To preview the main conclusion, we find evidence 
to suggest that this has been the case, hence justifying the need for accumulation of 
reserves by the Indonesian authorities. The next question that arises naturally from 
this is whether there is any way in which the liquidity yield from holding reserves 
may be generated without the need for Indonesia to continue to accumulate them. 
This is where a regional reserve pooling arrangement becomes relevant. But how 
might one judge the potential size of benefits of reserve pooling? This is the focus of 
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The appropriate exchange rate regime for economies in Asia remains a hotly 
debated subject ever since the East Asian financial debacle of 1997-98 (Rajan, 2002). 
The three East Asian economies most afflicted by the crisis, viz. Indonesia, Thailand 
and Korea all became official “floaters” since 1998 (Table 1). Nonetheless, there 
remain significant doubts at least in the cases of Indonesia and Thailand as to their de 
facto exchange rate policies. In the specific instance of Indonesia, a new central bank 
law enacted in 1999 clearly prescribes the stabilisation of rupiah’s value as the sole 
objective of Bank Indonesia. However, this Law has been subject to various 
interpretations. For instance, on the one hand, a “stable rupiah” could refer either to 
its value against the US dollar or some other benchmark (SDR, yen, currency basket). 
On the other, the objective could refer to domestic price stability which is effectively 
an “inflation targeting” regime. Indeed, the new Law in Indonesia has explicitly 
granted the central bank full authority to decide upon the inflation target to be 
achieved (goal independence) and freedom of choice over various monetary 
instruments to achieve the target
1.  
Alamsyah et. al (2001) see no contradictions between the two alternative 
interpretations of the new Law. As they note:  
(t)he distinction between these two interpretations, and any attributed  
ambiguity, may be overstated, however. In practice, exchange rate and 
price stability are usually closely correlated (p.314)
2. 
 
Indeed, Siregar and Rajaguru (2002) find fluctuations of the Indonesian rupiah 
to have significant pass through effects on the domestic prices. However, the critical 
                                                 
1 McLeod (2001) offers a useful discussion of Indonesia’s inflation target regime and questions its 
credibility. 
 
2 For a useful analytical discussion of the nexus between inflation targets and the exchange rate regime 
in emerging economies, see Eichengreen (2001). 
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point remains as to whether the de facto exchange rate policy involves explicit 
currency targeting as a goal in and of itself or as a means to achieving the inflation 
target (i.e. “flexible inflation target”). Statements by some senior Indonesian 
government officials appear to confuse more than clarify. There is a clear policy 
preference for a high degree of exchange rate stability for its own sake
3.  
But what do the data reveal? Examination of available data on Bank 
Indonesia’s open market operations points to a sharp increase in activity in recent 
years. By the end of 1999, the size of Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI) outstanding 
for rupiah intervention increased around seven fold from its level in 1997 and has 
remained extremely large since then (Table 2). The rapid accumulation of 
international reserves in Indonesia is also suggestive of a penchant towards a 
relatively greater degree of exchange rate fixity. Indonesia’s average foreign exchange 
reserve position has increased pointedly in recent years as the country has sought to 
stockpile reserves since they were run down in 1997-98 (Table 3). The willingness of 
countries like Indonesia to accumulate reserves despite their high fiscal costs (as 
reserve accumulation involves foregone domestic investments) is revealing (Bird and 
Rajan, 2003), and is further evidence of the possible acute “fear of floating” that seem 
to have afflicted so many emerging economies (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002 and Rajan, 
2002)
4. There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some East Asian 
economies have reverted to soft US dollar pegs (Kawaii and Takagi, 2000, Hernandez 
and Montiel, 2001 and McKinnon, 2001).   
                                                 
3 For instance, see “Indonesian VP Suggests Managed Float of Rupiah” by Agence France-Presse 
(www.inq7.net). The National Development Planning Minister, Kwik Kian Gie, had also proposed a 
fixed exchange rate regime to manage the volatile rupiah.  
 
4 Of course, another obvious reasons to accumulate reserves is to enhance the country’s overall 
liquidity position and a financial safeguard against capital account crises (Bird and Rajan, 2002a, 2003, 
Rajan and Siregar, 2003 and Rajan, 2003).    7
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section carefully 
examines the behaviour of the rupiah over the last seven years (1996 - 2002) to 
ascertain whether in fact there is specific evidence of a return to de facto US dollar 
pegging in Indonesia. To preview the main conclusion, we find evidence to suggest 
that this has been the case, hence justifying the need for accumulation of reserves by 
the Indonesian authorities. The next question that arises naturally from this is whether 
there is any way in which the liquidity yield from holding reserves may be generated 
without the need for Indonesia to continue to accumulate them. This is where a 
regional reserve pooling arrangement becomes relevant. But how might one judge the 
potential size of benefits of reserve pooling? Before this can be done, we first need to 
estimate the level of reserves that members would have to hold independently relative 
to pooling reserves (i.e. “hypothetical reserves”). Or, in other words, we need some 
measure of the extent of ”excess reserves” that are generated with pooling of reserves. 
Section 3 therefore examines these issues from Indonesia’s perspective if it were to 
participate in a regional reserve pooling with the rest of the East Asia (i.e. ASEAN-5 -
- Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore and the North Asian 
economies of Hong Kong, Korea, China and Japan). Such a reserve pool has been 
recently suggested as an important way of enhancing regional monetary cooperation 
and a logical next step in the Chiangmai swap initiative (Rajan and Siregar, 2003 and 
Rajan, Siregar and Bird, 2003). Taking a broader perspective, the final section offers a 
few closing comments on the ongoing macroeconomic and financial situation in 
Indonesia. 
 
2.  Modelling the Behaviour of the Indonesian Rupiah 
2.1   Estimating the Weights of the US Dollar and the Japanese Yen  8
Assuming that the Indonesian rupiah is managed against a basket of 
currencies, what are the de facto weights of the US dollar and the Japanese yen in the 
Indonesian rupiah’s overall currency basket? This section attempts to answer this 
question. 
For our purpose, the basic regression model employed to test for the behaviour 
of the nominal exchange rate of rupiah during the last seven years (1996-2002) is 
based on Frankel and Wei (1994). In their model, a relatively independent currency 
(Swiss franc) is chosen as an arbitrary numeraire for measuring nominal exchange 
rate variations. The regression is a multivariate ordinary least square (OLS) where the 
percentage changes in the nominal exchange rates of rupiah vis-à-vis the Swiss franc 
is regressed against the percentage changes in the nominal exchange rates of the US 
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A large and statistically significant coefficient () 2 β  implies that the movements of the 
US dollar have strongly influenced the fluctuations of the rupiah. A similar reasoning 
applies with regard to the coefficient for the Japanese yen() 3 β .  
To ensure that the test results are reliable we use high frequency weekly 
nominal exchange rate data from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service website                         
( http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/ ) We divide the observation sets into three sub-
periods: a) the pre-crisis: January 1996 to May 1997; b) the crisis: July 1997 to  9
December 1999; and c) the post-crisis: January 2000 to December 2002. 
Consideration of these three sub-periods allows us to compare and contrast the 
weights of the two key world currencies in explaining the fluctuations of the nominal 
rupiah during a) the pre-1997 financial crisis; b) the height of the crisis (1998 and 
1999); and c) the recovery years. 
The regression results are summarised in Table 4.
5 In addition to the constant 
parameter  ) ( 1 β , the estimated coefficient for the US dollar () 2 β  is the only other 
significant coefficient for the regression for the pre-crisis period (at 1 percent level). 
Judged by the adjusted R-square, the statistical model successfully explains over 90 
percent of the fluctuation of rupiah. This confirms the official pre-crisis soft US dollar 
peg (crawling band arrangement).  
Following a series of speculative attacks on regional currencies, the rupiah 
was floated on August 14, 1997. Our test result for the height of the crisis period (July 
1997 – December 1999) captures the outcome of the free floating period. The 
coefficient estimates for both the US dollar () 2 β  and the yen () 3 β are insignificant at 
the 10 percent level. The significantly larger standard errors for both the coefficients 
of the US dollar and the yen during the crisis vis-à-vis the pre-crisis period reflect the 
greater fluctuations of the rupiah against these two industrial country currencies 
during the height of the crisis. Furthermore, the adjusted R-square is only 18 percent, 
further reflecting the overall poor regression fit. 
Interestingly, the regression result for the post-crisis period is suggestive of a 
return to the pre-crisis pattern of de facto US dollar pegging. Although the coefficient 
estimates for both the US dollar and the Japanese yen are statistically significant, the 
former  () 2 β  is significant at even the 1 percent critical level while the latter is () 3 β  
significant at only the 10 percent. The relative prominence of the US dollar in the 
                                                 
5  Before conducting the OLS regression on Equation (1), we have employed the ADF and the KPSS 
Unit-Root test to evaluate the property of the relevant series. The results confirm that all of them are  10
Indonesian currency basket relative to the Japanese yen during the post-crisis period 
is also reflected by the relative sizes of the individual coefficient estimates. 
Specifically, the post-crisis period coefficient estimate for () 2 β  is 0.687 which is 
substantially larger than that for () 3 β which is 0.265. It is important to note that 
although the size of the post-crisis coefficient for the US dollar has risen compared to 
the second sub-period, it is still considerably lower than its pre-crisis level. 
Furthermore, while the goodness-of-fit as measured by the adjusted R-squared has 
increased in the post crisis period, it is only around 24 percent, far lower than during 
the crisis period.  
We conclude from the foregoing test results that the importance of the 
fluctuations in the US dollar in explaining the movements of the rupiah has increased 
in recent years. This said, there is a relatively higher degree of flexibility of the 
Indonesian rupiah in comparison to the pre-crisis period. This conclusion is fully 
consistent with other studies on Southeast Asian currency regimes (see Rajan, 2002 
and references cited within). The test results also seem to cast doubt over official 
claims that the rupiah is managed under a floating-cum inflation target regime. This 
said, we hasten to caution against drawing too definite a conclusion, as an inflation 
target could always be defined to be sufficiently “flexible” such that the exchange rate 
takes on a significantly high weight in the monetary policy objective function
6.  
 
2.2  Estimating the Volatilities of Rupiah vis-à-vis the US Dollar 
To further examine the behaviour of the local currency, we complement the 
foregoing regression analysis by estimating the changes in the volatility rate of the 
rupiah during the period under consideration. For the purpose of modeling the week-
to-week volatility of nominal exchange rates of rupiah against the US dollar, we 
                                                                                                                                            
I(0). Hence, the OLS test should be adequate in this case. For the sake of brevity, the unit-root test 
results are not posted in the paper, but can be made available upon request to the authors.   11
employ the Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticicty (GARCH 
(1,1)) model which is based on the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) family of statistical models.  
The GARCH (1,1) specification that we consider takes the following form: 
 
t t t t e dummy a NER a a NER + + + = − 2 1 1 0 ln ln , where  ) , 0 ( ~ t t h N e        (2) 
  t t t t t u dummy h e h + + + + = − − δ γ β α 1
2
1 .               (3) 














NER represents the weekly nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US 
dollar from January 1996 to December 2002 (Figure 1). The conditional variance 
equation (Eq. 3) described above is a function of three terms: a) the mean α ; (b) 
news about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of the squared 
residual from the mean equation: 
2
1 − t e  (the ARCH  term); and c) the last period’s 
forecast error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH term). We also add a dummy variable to 
capture the crisis period and the shift in the exchange rate policy. The dummy is set 
to 0 up to July 1997 and 1 from August 1997 to December 2002.   
We estimated different types of ARCH models such as ARCH, GARCH and 
EGARCH models. The best results are found to be GARCH (1,1) (Table 5). All of the 
coefficient estimates  γ β α , , (  and  ) δ are significant at the 1 percent level. The 
positive and significant coefficient estimate for the crisis dummy implies that the 
conditional variance (or the volatility index),  t h , has increased due to the 
                                                                                                                                            
6 This is turn leads to the important question of how one might distinguish between a sufficiently 
flexible inflating target and a currency basket regime a la Williamson (1999a,b).   12
uncertainties associated with the crisis. Several noteworthy findings bear highlighting 
(Table 5 and Figure 2). 
Following the relative stability and a modest average of volatility during the 
pre-crisis period, the conditional variance of rupiah jumped by more than 450 times 
during the crisis period vis-à-vis the average for the pre-crisis. The speculative 
attacks at the peak of the crisis and the adoption of the “temporary” free-floating 
regime and consequent loss of the nominal anchor consequently brought about an 
unprecedented level of volatility of the rupiah in 1998 and 1999. Socio-political 
uncertainties, marked by the downfall of the Suharto regime in early 1998, as well as 
inconsistent and incoherent macroeconomic policies obviously contributed 
significantly to the volatility of rupiah (Soesastro and Basri (1998) and Johnson 
(1998)). The return of some degree of stability in rupiah against the US dollar started 
to be felt from 2000 onwards. The average post-crisis volatility rate is estimated at 
around 17 percent of the reported rate during the height of the crisis. These volatility 
patterns of the rupiah against the US dollar is yet further evidence of the possible 
reversion to a soft US dollar pegged regime in Indonesia.         
 
3.  Assessing the Size and Benefits of a Reserve Pool 
  As noted, one of the consequences of maintaining a soft dollar peg is the need 
to hold a substantial amount of foreign exchange reserves. The costs of doing so 
might be reduced with a greater degree of regional monetary cooperation. The 
modalities and institutional arrangements needed for a reserve pooling arrangement 
have been detailed by Rajan and Siregar (2003) who also suggest two ways of 
estimating the benefits of a reserve pool. The first is a simple import-based one, while 
the second takes into account some measure of the level of reserve variability. We 
consider both measures in some detail below. 
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3.1  Reserve-to-Imports Ratio Revisited 
A rather crude yet useful yardstick might be based on the following reasoning. 
Assume reserve pooling is undertaken as part of a larger policy of economic 
integration that includes trade integration. In such a case, a large part of intra-regional 
which was originally considered to be external will no longer be so. Insofar as the 
reserve to imports (R/M) ratio is considered a reasonable, albeit highly imperfect, 
yardstick of reserve adequacy (Bird and Rajan, 2003), the “disappearance” of a large 
chunk of external trade will now imply that the region will be holding a substantial 
pool of “excess reserves”
7.  
To ascertain the gains from reserve pooling we first compute the international 






Ratio =         ( 4 )  
where:  IND R  is the average level of reserve held by Indonesia alone and  IND M  is the 
average monthly level of imports of Indonesia. Therefore, Ratiois simply the number 
of months of import coverage for Indonesia.  
If reserve pooling among the East Asian economies is part of a larger goal of 
trade integration, the arrangement implies that no reserves are needed to cover the 
imports of a member country originating from other member countries of the same 
group. Consequently, the same average level of individual country reserve holdings 
should correspond to a higher monthly import coverage. Conversely, to maintain the 
same import coverage, each member country and the region needs to hold a   








=        ( 5 )  
 
where: (s) is the share of intraregional imports in the overall imports of Indonesia. 
The closer (s) is to one, the greater the proportion of intra-regional imports to total 
imports, and the larger the ) (Ratiopol for Indonesia. 
  Next, our aim is to compute the “hypothetical reserve level” defined as the 
level of total international reserves  ) (HR that Indonesia would have to hold to have 
the same months of import coverage that it would have under the pooling 
arrangement. In other words: 
 
IND M Ratiopol HR * =      ( 6 )  
 
The average excess gains from joining the pooling for each individual member is: 
 
IND R HR ER − =        ( 7 )  
where: (ER) is the excess reserve level during the specified period. 
Table 6 reports the findings for the period of 1990-1998. The selection of time 
period is dictated by the information available on the share of the intra-regional 
imports (s) available from ICSEAD (2000). We obtain the foreign exchange reserve 
data from the IFS CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The computations reveal that individually (without any pooling arrangement) 
the average reserve that Indonesia holds at anytime during the specified time period 
amounts to about 5 months of imports. A high average share of intra-regional imports 
                                                                                                                                            
7 This was one of the questions asked during the advent of the euro.  15
in the overall imports of Indonesia is also found during the period, at about 43 
percent. Based on the size of (s), we calculate the ) (Ratiopol and find that the number 
of months of import coverage should increase to around 9 months of imports, 
equivalent to an extra of four months of import coverage from the non-pooling level. 
We next calculate the size of the Hypothetical reserve and the corresponding excess 
reserves. We find that roughly around US$10 billion of excess reserve will be created 
by committing to the pooling. But what are the fiscal costs of holding the “excess” 
reserves?  
Strictly speaking, since the opportunity costs of holding reserves are the real 
investments (capital imports) foregone, we ought to be using the difference between 
the marginal product of capital (MPK) and the yield on foreign interest rates on liquid 
assets to estimate the fiscal costs. Since accurate and timely information on the 
marginal product of capital in Indonesia is not easily available, we compute the fiscal 
costs (FC) as follows: 
 
( ) ER FC
USA IND * int int − =        ( 8 )  
 
where: ) (FC   is the estimated fiscal cost.  ) (int
IND  is the average annually of the 3 to 6 
months time deposit rate offered by the commercial banks in Indonesia.  ) (int
USA is the 
equivalent average deposit rate offered by US commercial banks. We obtain interest 
rate data from the IFS CD-ROM
8.  
                                                 
8 We assume for simplicity that the bulk of East Asian reserves is held in US dollars. This is probably 
not too far from reality. In 1999, 78 percent of global international reserves were in US dollars 
(D’Arista, 2000). Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) offer a recent discussion on the currency 
composition of international reserves. 
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The average interest rate in Indonesia is close to 15 percent premium over the 
equivalent US rate. This translates to about more than US$ 1.5 billion of an annual 
average fiscal cost that Indonesia had to incur during the period examined. It is 
important to note here however that the results summarized in Table 6 are likely to 
undercount the true fiscal cost as the cost of the financial capital in East Asia 
(reflected by the deposit interest rate) is invariably far lower than the marginal cost of 
capital. 
 
3.2    Variability of Reserves: Coverage Index 
While the preceding measure of excess reserves is certainly intuitive, there are at least 
two problems with it.  
One, there are obvious limitations of using imports as a scaling factor for determining 
reserve adequacy. Crises of the 1990s and beyond that have afflicted many middle-income 
developing countries have predominantly been crises of the capital account (Rajan, 2003). 
Reserve adequacy benchmarks accordingly need to be modified to allow for both imports and 
capital outflows as potential drains on reserves (Bird and Rajan, 2003 and Reddy, 2002). For 
instance, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) states  
(W)ith the changing profile of capital flows, the traditional approach of 
assessing reserve adequacy in terms of import cover has been broadened to 
include a number of parameters which take into account the size, 
composition, and risk profiles of various types of capital flows as well as the 
types of external shocks to which the economy is vulnerable (Reddy, 2002, 
p.6). 
 
Two, the foregoing implicitly assumes that reserve pooling is done in tandem 
with intensified trade integration. While the issue of trade versus monetary 
regionalism in an era of intensified capital flows is an important one that has been 
explored elsewhere (see Bird and Rajan, 2002b), what if the region does not form a  17
free (preferential) trade bloc?
9 Is there some way of gauging the amount of “excess 
reserves” independent of any assumptions regarding regional trade integration?    
Since international reserve holdings have been found to be a theoretically and 
statistically significant determinant of creditworthiness (see Bird and Rajan, 2003 and 
Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001 and references cited within), depleting them as a way 
of cushioning the effect of capital outflows on the exchange rate may make matters 
worse by inducing further capital outflows. If capital outflows reflect a perception 
within private capital markets that a country is illiquid, reducing international reserves 
and therefore curbing liquidity further in a financially fragile environment is unlikely 
to be an effective strategy. In other words, the reversibility that makes reserve 
depletion credible in the context of trade deficits is often absent in the context of 
capital outflows. As noted by Reddy (2002) 
There is a tendency among the analysts and media to react negatively 
to erosion in a more intensive way and positively to addition to 
reserves in a less intensive way.  A higher level of reserves may 
possibly give greater scope for changes by making them appear 
marginal (p.10). 
 
  In view of the foregoing, there seems to be sound rationale to minimise the 
degree of variability of reserve holdings. How is this related to a reserve pool? 
Medhora (1992b) observes 
By belonging to the reserve pool, the member countries have…access 
to the others’ reserve during times of need. At the same time, by 
pooling, each country is taking on the variability of the entire pool, 
rather than just the variability of its own reserves (p.213).  
 
Coverage Index: It has long been argued that one of the more appropriate 
ways of measuring international reserve adequacy is to compare average reserve 
holdings to their variability (Medhora, 1992a,b and Williams et al., 2001). This so-
called reserve coverage index encompasses the two potential sources of gains in 
                                                 
9 This is an important point -- while the ASEAN and China are planning on forming an FTA over the 
next decade or so, Japan and Korea are not (yet) part of this policy initiative.   18
reserve pooling, viz. an increase in average reserve holdings (or access to reserves) 
and a decrease in its variability.  




Ci =       ( 9 )  
 
where:  PR is the average level of reserve holdings (or access to reserves) during a 
time period,  ) (PR Var is their variability during the same period
10.  
  Each individual country may also consider a partial pool, whereby they can 
each access all its own reserves as well as the partially pooled reserves of all the other 
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where: p is the degree of pooling  ) 1 0 ( ≤ ≤ p  and  i R and  j R  are the total reserves of 
country i and j  (the members of the pool).  
  From Eqs. 9 and 10, it is clear that the coverage under reserve pooling will be 
higher than that in the autonomous state if the variability of the pool is lower than that 
of each country’s reserves separately, or if the increased access to the larger pool of 
reserves outweighs the higher variability of the pooled reserves. The formulation of 
the pooled-coverage index assumes each country has unrestricted access to the pool. 
                                                 
10 Variability of PR is represented by the standard deviation of the reserve during a specified time 
period.  19
When one country draws down the pool, it reduces coverage for the other member 
countries. Hence, the pooled system is a zero sum game. The gains and losses from 
pooling can be quantified by examining the hypothetical scenario of “what if each 
country had wanted to maintain the level of coverage that it actually enjoyed from the 
pooling arrangement, but did not belong to the pool” (Medhora, 1992b, p.217).  
The hypothetical reserve is calculated as follows: 
 
) ( * i i i R Var C HR =        ( 1 1 )  
 
i HR  is the hypothetical reserve -- the level of reserves that each country would have 
had to hold had it not belonged to the pool, but still wanted to maintain the coverage 
actually afforded by the pool.  i C  is the coverage index of country iunder the pooling, 
and ) ( i R Var is the variability of country i’s own reserves. The gains/losses from 
reserve pooling may be measured as follows: 
 
PR HR L G − = /        ( 1 2 )  
 
where:  ) / ( L G is the gain (+) or loss (-) in international reserve levels. HR and PR are 
the hypothetical and actual average foreign exchange reserves, respectively. 
  Table 7 reports the average quarterly reserve holdings for Indonesia and its 
variability from the last quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 2002
11. Based on this 
data, we first compute the coverage index without pooling (0 percent) and simulate 
the country’s coverage index by imposing an additional 10 percent level of pooling 
                                                 
11 The initial period of last quarter 1993 was selected due to the availability of the foreign exchange 
reserve holding data for a selected number of countries from the IFS CD-ROM, IMF.  20
commitment at each stage (from 10 percent pooling to 100 percent pooling). As 
shown in Table 7, the highest coverage index for Indonesia can be attained if the 
country commits to 20 percent pooling
12 
Without pooling, the coverage index for Indonesia is at around 3.07. Indonesia 
enjoys the highest coverage (3.15) if its pools 20 percent of its reserves. In such a 
case, the reserve pooling arrangement generates excess reserves of around US$539 
million which translates into an annual fiscal cost of around US$77 million. As noted, 
this fiscal cost is in all likelihood an underestimation as the financial cost of capital in 
Indonesia (which was used in our computations) will be far lower that the marginal 
product of capital which is the more theoretically appropriate measure to use.  
 
4.  Concluding Comments: Current Macroeconomic and Financial Situation 
in Indonesia  
 
  Although both fiscal and external vulnerabilities continue to decline in 
Indonesia, financing of economic recovery remains extremely precarious.  
On the external front, the external debt to GDP ratio has fallen substantially 
from 120 percent at the peak of the crisis in 1998, but remains uncomfortably high at 
around 72 percent in September 2002. The World Bank (2003) claims that the 
country’s external debt due in 2003 is about 58 percent of the gross international 
reserves.  
On the fiscal front, the country has also managed to cut its budget deficit from 
around 3.7 percent of GDP at the end of 2001 to around 2.5 percent in 2002. The 
government has targeted a budget deficit of around 1.8 in 2003, roughly 0.5 percent 
higher than originally planned because of the stimulus needed to assist Bali 
recovering from the terrorist attacks in late 2002.  
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Cuts in oil price subsidies and electricity and telephone tariffs were initially 
expected to contribute to the attainment of targeted smaller budget deficit in 2003. 
However, the official announcement in early 2003 to reduce the subsidies on these 
key commodities was met by street protests. The government was eventually forced to 
backtrack and indefinitely postpone these essential cuts in subsidies. With a deficit of 
1.8 percent of GDP, the total budgetary financing needs for the fiscal year 2003 are 
expected to be around US$3.8 billion of foreign financing (World Bank, 2003). Of 
this, about US$2.5 billion is to be financed domestically, including from the 
privatisation and the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) asset sales. To 
meet the rest of the budgetary needs, the government of Indonesia has often relied on 
the annual financing agreed upon between the government of Indonesia and the 
Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)
13. 
  The problem at the financial front has been further compounded by a poor 
domestic investment climate. Increased violence and crime, corruption and 
bureaucratic delay and inefficiency, uncertainty in the labour market, and excessive 
taxation by some local governments are some of the fundamental problems deterring 
investments. By the end of 2002, investment approvals had fallen to slightly over 
US$10 billion, from more than US$25 billion in 2000. The country’s share in 
Japanese outward FDI to Asia has fallen to about 5 percent during the first 9 months 
of 2002, from about 21 percent in 1996 (World Bank (2003))   
Finding alternative sources of funds is undoubtedly a critical task for 
Indonesia at this stage. As shown in this paper, pooling of reserves with other East 
                                                                                                                                            
12 This 20 percent figure is specific to Indonesia. It varies for other countries individually and for the 
whole group. See Rajan and Siregar (2003) and Rajan, Siregar and Bird (2003) for detailed discussions. 
13  The CGI consists of over 30 multilateral and bilateral donors led by the World Bank. They meet 
with the government of Indonesia annually. Around US$2-3 billion of fresh loans for Indonesia have 
been decided by the annual meeting during the past three years. The last meeting was held in January 
2003.     22
Asian economies may be a means by which Indonesia and other regional economies 
are able to generate the much-needed extra financial resources to aid development. 
For a highly indebted economy such as Indonesia, in particular, the excess foreign 
exchange reserves could be put in a better use by paying some of the debt. As the 
Economist (September 23-29, 2000) put it, “it is rather as though a household with 
lots of cash sitting idle in a low-interest bank account was at the same time paying a 
much higher interest rate on its debt. It would make more sense to repay some of that 
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Table 1: Official Exchange Rate Arrangements 
 












Table 2: Rupiah Intervention 
 

















      
Total Amount of Outstanding SBI for Rupiah Intervention in the 
Market 


















Note: Data for 1998 is not available. 





Table 3: Accumulations of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 




Quarter 1, 1996-  




Quarter 2, 1997- 
Quarter 4, 1999 
 
Post-Crisis: 
Quarter 1, 2000- 








Table 4: Weekly Regressions of Rupiah, US dollar and Yen 
 
  US$ coefficient:  2 β  
(standard error) 
Yen coefficient:  3 β  





















































* significant at 10 percent level; 
** significant at 5 percent level; 

















Mean of h  
























* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent 
level;
 a/ Pre-crisis period: January 1996 - May 1997; 
b/ Crisis: July 1997 - December 1999; 
c/ 
Post-Crisis: January 2000 – December 2002.  27
Table 6: Reserve-Import Ratio With and Without Pooling 
 






































































Table 7: Reserve, Coverage Index and Fiscal Cost 
 
(Without Pooling and With 20% Pooling) 
 































































a / The largest coverage index for Indonesia can be attained when the country commits to 20 
percent pooling. The pooling includes ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
and Singapore), Korea, China, Hong Kong and Japan. 
 
b /  The hypothetical reserve is calculated for the 20 percent pooling.  28
Figure 1: Weekly Nominal Exchange Rate of Rupiah against the US dollar 
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